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Abstract 
A distributed architecture for a system simulating the emotional state of an agent acting 
in a virtual environment is presented. The system is an implementation of an event-
appraisal model of emotional behaviour and uses neural networks to learn how the 
emotional state should be influenced by the occurrence of environmental and internal 
stimuli. A part of the modular system is domain-independent. The system can easily be 
adapted for handling different events that influence the emotional state. A first 
prototype and a testbed for this architecture are presented.  
1 Introduction 
This paper presents results of ongoing research on human-computer interaction with intelligent 
conversational agents in virtual environments. It reports work in a project aiming at the design and 
agent-oriented implementation of a multi-user, multi-agent and multi-modal interactive 
environment [Nijholt 1999]. 
Our interest in emotions and our objective to simulate emotional behaviour finds its primary 
motivation in the hypothesis that avatars that somehow show emotions in the way they behave are 
more believable than agents that lack these human qualities.  
There is another motive for incorporating emotions in the design of synthetic agents; often 
mentioned by AI-researchers. A. Damasio came with neurological evidence for the importance of 
emotions in human decision processes [Damasio 1994]. The interaction between emotions and the 
rational processes that underlie the making of decisions could possibly explain why humans are so 
good in making decisions in a context of uncertainty. Answering the question whether machines can 
have emotions, M. Minsky even stated:  “The question is not whether intelligent machines can have 
any emotions, but whether machines can be intelligent without any emotions” [Minsky 1986]. 
Hence the idea to give synthetic agents emotions in order to make it possible that they perform 
whatever tasks they have in a more intelligent way. Whether there is some sense in this depends on 
the notion of emotion one has in mind and on the analysis of the aspects involved in the process of 
decision-making. 
 
To model and to simulate all of the relevant aspects of emotions in a comprehensive system is a 
project for years, so it shouldn’t come as a surprise that every group that’s conducting research on 
the topic of emotional agents has made it’s own decisions as to what aspects are built into their 
system, and what is left out for (hopefully) future development. Most groups [Reilly & Bates 1992, 
El-Nasr & Yen 1988, Velásquez 1997] have taken a wide range of topics related to emotions (e.g. 
emotion, facial expressions and emotional behaviour) into account for their emotional systems. 
Until now we have only looked at the topic “simulation of emotions”, as we think it’s best to focus 
on one topic at a time.  
We think of an emotional agent as an agent that has among other things (e.g. believes, desires and 
intentions) an emotional state. This emotional state can be altered by stimuli from the environment 
or by stimuli from internal elements of an agent (e.g. decisions, future expectations, memory, etc.). 
“Simulation of emotions” consists of the elements that appraise the stimuli and the processes that 
take care of the dynamics of the emotional state. In principle, every kind of behaviour and internal 
process of an agent can make use of the emotional state. For instance, the emotional state can be 
used to steer the facial expressions and the decision process. Consequently, our agents don’t show 
emotions yet. A user can only get an impression of what the agent “feels”, by looking at a 
representation of the emotional state.   
For our model of emotions, we have two basic concerns. We want our model to resemble the 
emotional processes, as they exist within the human brain, as closely as possible and consequently 
we don’t want to diverge too much from the leading theories of emotions. On the other hand we 
also want to develop a computational approach, which can be easily used to implement an 
emotional agent.  
 
Our research is very much ongoing and some of the elements presented in this paper haven’t been 
properly tested yet. This paper will give an overview of how we dealt with the problem of emotions 
until now and what our approach for the future will be. Furthermore an architecture for the 
simulation of emotions will be introduced.  
First the relevant models of emotions will be discussed shortly. After that we will globally describe 
what our approach is, followed by a description of the environment that we used as a testbed. 
Subsequently our distributed architecture will be introduced, by firstly explaining the architecture 
as a whole and secondly by discussing the various subparts in more detail. A description of a first 
prototype will be given next to further clarify the architecture and to present some first test results. 
The paper will be concluded by a comparison with another model and some conclusive remarks.  
2 Theories of emotion 
In this section, two theories on emotion will be introduced. How we used these theories for our 
model will be explained in the next section.  
 
Event appraisal models1 have as assumption, that it’s the subjective, cognitive interpretation of 
events that explains the experienced emotions.  
Event appraisal models mainly focus on the question how events are appraised and in which 
direction (and with what velocity) the emotional state is likely to shift. We think of this as the 
emotional meaning of an event. Usually event appraisal models don’t model the dynamics of the 
emotional state: if an event is appraised, what will then become the new emotional state? For an AI-
model of emotion this question is as important as a natural appraisal of events.  
                                                 
1
 For instance [Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988] and [Roseman, Jose & Spindel 1990] 
 One of the leading event appraisal models is the model of Ortony, Clore and Collins (The OCC 
Model) [Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988]. The model only looks at emotion types. Each type contains 
a large number of emotional states, which may differ in intensity (e.g. the emotional states: worried, 
scared and terrified belong to the emotion type fear), but may also differ because of other reasons, 
such as the cause of the emotion (e.g. the emotional state heartache differs from other emotional 
states belonging to the emotion type distress). By focusing on emotion types instead of emotions, 
the whole field of emotions gets more comprehensible.  
In order to appraise a particular event, there are three different aspects that can be focused on. Every 
aspect has a different set of emotion types attached to it. We will elaborate a bit on the different 
aspects by means of an example. Imagine that someone hears that his sister-in-law has just killed 
one of his children. If that someone focuses on the consequences of the event, he’ll probably 
experience distress. If he focuses on the action of the agent (the sister-in-law), he’ll probably 
experience reproach. And if he looks at the aspects of an object (aspects of the sister-in-law) he’ll 
probably experience hate.  
Associated with each aspect is a different kind of knowledge representation. If one focuses on the 
consequences of an event, goals are of importance. If one focuses on the action of an agent, 
standards are of importance and if one focuses on the action of an agent, attitudes are relevant.  
A strong point of the OCC model, which makes it particularly useful for designing an AI-model of 
emotion, is that the model includes a complete set of variables that influence the intensity of the 
emotions.  The variables can be global, which means that the variable influences all of the emotion 
types, or local, which means that the variable influences only some of the emotion types. We will 
shortly introduce the (in our opinion) three most important local variables. The variable desirability 
is important if one focuses on the consequences of an event. The variable praiseworthiness is 
important if one focuses on the actions of an agent and the variable appealingness is important if 
one focuses on the aspects of an object.  
 
Besides the event appraisal models, there are more theories of emotions we found interesting and 
useful. One of those is Frijda’s notion of emotion [Frijda 1986]. According to him, emotion is 
action readiness change, which refers to the inner disposition (and the absence) for performing 
actions and achieving relational change, as it exists at a particular moment. The experience of 
emotion largely consists of experienced action readiness or unreadiness: an impulse to flee, strike or 
embrace; or lack of impulse, apathy, listlessness. So, emotion is not the same as the feeling of 
emotion. A consequence of this is, that an explicit representation of emotions is unlikely to exist.  
3 Our approach 
Our research goal is to develop a human like agent that shows natural emotional behaviour. Yet, as 
we didn’t want to start too ambitiously we are firstly focusing on simple agents in a simulated 
environment. The agents and the environment shall be introduced in the next section. 
 
Our model is very much an implementation of the more theoretical OCC model. First of all, only 
events can alter the emotional state. Furthermore, the representation of emotion consists of the same 
emotion types the OCC model distinguishes, the three aspects of events also play a central role in 
our model and the same variables (the properties of events that are important for emotions) as in the 
OCC model will be used. Furthermore, the agents will contain a representation of goals, standards 
and attitudes.   
 
The current state of research on emotions is, that a lot of work has been done on philosophical 
questions like: “What are emotions?”, “What influences emotions?”, “Which emotions can be 
distinguished?” and “What is the connection between cognition and emotion?”, but no complete 
quantitative models of emotions (besides some AI-models) have been developed yet. Apparently 
it’s very difficult to describe the emotional behaviour in a complete and precise manner. On the 
other hand we noticed that it’s relatively easy to imagine in practical situations what would be 
natural behaviour.  
Therefore we chose an approach in which the system has to learn about emotional processes and 
rules from examples provided by a trainer. Most other research groups have used a completely 
opposite approach. In their systems the designer has to define the emotional processes and rules, 
from which natural emotional behaviour has to originate. We’ll use the common terms top-down 
approach for our approach and bottom-up approach for the other approach (Figure 1 gives a 
schematic representation of the two concepts). 
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Figure 1 A top-down approach vs. a bottom up approach 
 
 
For our approach trainingsdata is needed, which will be obtained through annotation. We realize 
that annotation is a time-consuming and tedious task and therefore we defined the architecture in 
such a way, that a minimal amount of trainingsdata is required.   
Another advantage of a top-down approach above a bottom-up approach is, that it’s more flexible; 
the same system can be used for more applications, which is for instance practical if one wants to 
design agents with different personalities. Using a different trainingsset for each personality is an 
easy way to do this. Of course the same effect may be obtained in a bottom-up approach by 
changing some of the parameters, but we strongly doubt if parameters can be defined in such a way 
that it offers the same flexibility as a top-down approach does.  
  
As we want to design a system that only needs a small amount of trainingsdata, it’s especially 
important that the system is able to generalize well. This is one of the proven qualities of neural 
networks, and accordingly we will use those for our system. For the emotion domain, it isn’t very 
important that the system works very accurately in a quantitative way (the chosen numerical 
representation of emotions is a rough estimate anyway), as long as it performs well in a qualitative 
way and reasonably well in a quantitative way. Therefore relatively small neural networks can be 
used, which should enhance the generalization capacities of the system even more.  
As Frijda’s theory of emotions clearly suggests, an explicit representation of emotions is unlikely to 
exist within the human brain. We do not only think that an explicit representation of emotions is 
unlikely from a cognitive point of view, but we also think that a wrongly chosen representation 
might have a strong negative effect on the capacities of the system to show a wide range of 
emotional phenomena. By using recurrent neural networks, the system can learn an optimal, 
implicit representation of emotions itself, which we see as a major advantage of a connectionist 
approach.  
4 The environment and the agents 
In order to develop and test a system that simulates emotions, an environment is needed, which is 
inhabited by agents that can have emotions. As we want to model a broad range of emotions, the 
environment and the agents must satisfy a number of requirements. 
  
As we make use of the OCC model as basis for our AI-model of emotion, it’s important that the 
agents have an explicit or implicit representation of goals, standards and attitudes1. Agents should 
also be able to translate observations into terms of these three concepts. In practice this last 
requirement has the following consequences:  
 
• Agents should be able to see if an event satisfies a particular goal or has a positive or 
negative effect on the probability that a particular goal will be satisfied (important for the 
emotion types joy and distress).  
• Agents must be able to reason about the future and should be able to change their 
expectations of the future as a consequence of events. Expectations about goals are 
important for emotion types such as hope and fear. 
• Agents must have some kind of memory about previous expectations and should be able to 
compare new events to these previous expectations (important for the emotion types relief, 
fears-confirmed, satisfaction and disappointment). 
• The same kind of reasoning the agents must be able to do for themselves, they must be able 
to do for other agents also (important for emotion types happy-for, resentment, gloating and 
pity). 
• Agents must be able to compare actions of themselves or of other agents to their standards 
(important for emotion types pride, shame, admiration and reproach).  
• Finally, agents must be able to compare aspects of objects or agents to their attitudes 
(important for emotion types love and hate).  
  
The future must be partly uncertain for the agents. If it’s precisely known what’s going to happen in 
the future, emotions such as hope and fear cannot exist. A way to guarantee this is by making the 
environment nondeterministic. Another important property of the environment is, that it contains 
multiple agents, as some emotions depend on actions of other agents or on the consequences of 
events for other agents.  
As the user has to annotate natural emotional behaviour, it’s important that the user is able to put 
himself in the position of an agent. A user can only do this, if the behaviour of the agent is 
believable enough and if the user has the exact same knowledge as the agent. A final requirement of 
the environment is, that the situations are complex enough, such that interesting emotional 
behaviour can arise. 
We set out to define and implement an environment, which satisfies all the previously stated 
constraints. For the domain we were inspired by [Inoue, Kawabata & Kobayashi 1996]. In Figure 2 
a picture of the domain can be seen.  
                                                 
1
 We refer to [Reilly & Bates 1992] for a good example of an implementation of these concepts. 
 Figure 2 Picture of the environment 
 
 
The domain is a gridworld containing grass, water pools that can be dry or contain water, apple 
trees that can have apples growing and rocks, with possibly herbs growing on it. The status of the 
trees, water pools and rocks constantly changes in a nondeterministic way.  
Multiple agents inhabit the gridworld. One of the agents can be seen in the middle of the picture. An 
agent can only see a small part of the world (the light part). Currently the agent sees one predator 
(directly beneath the agent) and one tree with an apple (directly south-east of the predator). An 
agent only knows where the visible agents and predators are and he knows the location of all the 
trees, rocks and water pools, but the status is only known of the visible trees, rocks and water pools.  
 
A trainer can only see the things an agent can see; in the light part, a trainer can see everything, just 
like an agent, and in the dark part, a trainer sees only the locations of the trees, rocks and water 
pools, as this is also knowledge that an agent possesses. Because of this, it’s easier for a trainer to 
imagine what an agent feels. A trainer also knows how hungry, thirsty and healthy an agent is, 
which events have occurred lately and what his current action is.  
 
Agents need food and water, which can be supplied by apple trees and water pools. There are 
predators that can be dangerous for the agents. An attack by a predator affects the health of an 
agent. An agent can regain health by eating an herb.  
To a large extent, the behaviour of a predator is random. The only exception is when a predator is in 
the neighbourhood of food, water or an herb. Then it will stay there because it knows that agents 
will come there sooner or later. This means that the presence of a predator is an indication that food, 
water or an herb may be nearby. On the other hand the presence of food, water or an herb is an 
indication that a predator may be nearby.  
Agents are able to make decisions and have all the previously described capacities. There is a social 
order between agents and they can choose (dependent on their character) either to follow the leader 
of a group or to go their own way. Social grouping is a result of common concerns. An agent knows 
how thirsty, hungry and healthy the agents in his group are.   
5 The system 
5.1 The architecture 
In this section, the architecture for our system will be introduced. First a global overview of the 
system will be given and after that the various concepts and subparts will be discussed in more 
detail. For the system we have chosen a distributed architecture, as depicted in Figure 3. The 
motivations for this particular architecture will be given after a brief introduction.  
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Figure 3 Schematic representation of the architecture 
 
From a functional perspective, the task of the system is to convert an event with particular 
properties into a new emotional state. In order to convert an event to a new emotional state, two 
phases are distinguished.   
The first phase is to appraise the emotional meaning of the event. This is the task of an Event 
Appraiser. Each event belongs to maximally one event type (e.g. the event: An agent sees an apple 
at a particular location while he has a particular desire for food belongs to the “Apple_spotted” 
event type). For each relevant event type, one event appraiser is defined. The content of the event 
information depends on the type of the event and can vary greatly from one event type to another. 
To sum up, when an event occurs, first the event type of the event has to be established. Then it’s 
exactly known which Event Appraiser has to be used and what kind of information is needed for 
appraisal.  
In the second phase, the Emotional State Calculator (the ESC) uses a numerical representation of 
the emotional meaning of the event (firstly stored in an EIV and secondly stored in an NEIV; both 
will be explained in detail later on) to calculate the new emotional state. A history of previous 
emotional states and emotional events is implicitly stored within the ESC, which is implemented by 
a recurrent neural network. The Normalizers form an interface between the Event Appraisers and 
the ESC. The task of a Normalizer is to normalize the data in an EIV, such that the ESC can treat all 
of the Event Appraiser in a uniform way. The Normalizers will also be implemented by neural 
networks. 
This approach has a few qualities: 
 
• Conformity with emotion theory. As mentioned before, emotion theorists are inclined to 
see the appraisal of events as a separate problem. In this architecture, the appraisal of events 
is explicitly a subpart of the system.  
• Conformity with human intuition. In our first annotation attempts, we noticed that if we 
had to predict a new emotional state, given an event and the old emotional state, that we 
were inclined to first look only at the event and imagine what kind of emotional 
consequences this event might have and only after that we looked at the old emotional state 
and predicted a new emotional state. Therefore the way the system works conforms at least 
to our intuition and maybe also to the intuition of most people. This is an important 
property, as this means that the annotation task (which will be explained in the section on 
training) will be relatively easy. 
• Trainability. The different subparts can be kept relatively small, as a result of which the 
various neural networks can be trained more easily and with a smaller amount of 
trainingsdata.  
• Possibility of incremental development. This approach allows that events are added to the 
system one-by-one. This is a big advantage from a software engineering point of view.  
• Scalability. If the domain gets more complicated (meaning more types of events), the 
amount of neural networks within the system will increase, but the complexity of the neural 
networks will remain the same. This means that the scalability of the system shouldn’t be a 
problem, if the amount of types of events increases. Whether the system is scalable in other 
dimensions also (e.g. the amount of modelled emotions) is one of the open research 
questions remaining.  
• Reusability of the ESC. The ESC is domain-independent and therefore can be reused for 
different agents in different domains.  
5.2 Emotion Impulse Vectors 
An Emotion Impulse Vector (an EIV) is a data structure especially suited for storing the emotional 
meaning of an event. The structure of an EIV has been chosen as follows: 
 
EIV = <ei1, ei2, ..., ein> 
 
in which every emotion type ei has a corresponding emotion impulse eii. The emotion impulse eii 
indicates how the emotion ei is likely to change. For instance a high positive value for eii means that 
the EIV probably will have a large positive effect on the emotion ei.  
A Normalized Emotion Impulse Vector (an NEIV) is a normalized version of an EIV. How the 
normalization functions, will be explained later on.  
5.3 Event Appraisal 
The task of an Event Appraiser is to assess the emotional meaning of an event to construct an EIV. 
Every event and domain has its own properties and therefore an Event Appraiser should be 
constructed separately for every event type. This way a priori knowledge about the event and 
domain can be used in an optimal way. A consequence of this is, that an Event Appraiser can be 
implemented by a neural network, but can just as well be implemented by a rule-based system, a 
function or something else. 
 
Defining or training an Event Appraiser that can immediately communicate with the ESC in such a 
way that the behaviour of the total system is precisely as required, would mean a full understanding 
of the ESC and would at least make defining or training the Event Appraiser a very difficult task. 
Therefore we introduced the Normalizers. Their task is to convert an EIV to an NEIV such that the 
behaviour of the total system works as required. As the Normalizers only have to do scaling 
operations, and therefore only have to learn linear or near linear functions, the Normalizers can be 
simple feedforward networks with only a few hidden neurons.  
A nice property of using Normalizers is that the Normalizers can easily correct quantitative errors 
of the Event Appraisers and the ESC. Therefore it’s not very important that the Event Appraisers 
and the ESC work well in a quantitative way, just as long as they work well in a qualitative way.  
 
The inputs of an Event Appraiser are the variables defined in the OCC model or properties of an 
event that can be used to calculate the variables. The current action of the agent is a special kind of 
property, which can be important to appraise an event. For instance, an agent is bound to appraise 
the event of spotting a predator differently if he’s attacking than if he’s fleeing.  
5.4 The Emotional State Calculator 
The task of ESC is to calculate a new emotional state given a NEIV.  Although the ESC is one 
neural network, conceptually it can be seen as two different parts. The first part, the core of the 
ESC, is a recurrent network and models all of the emotional behaviour. The state of the recurrent 
network can be seen as an implicit emotional state. We will implement the implicit emotional state 
with an Elman network [Elman 1990]. 
The second part of the ESC is a feed forward network, which has the implicit emotional state as 
input. This part, the Emotional state monitor, has as task to translate the implicit emotional state, 
which is very hard to understand and use to influence the behaviour, into an explicit emotional state. 
The structure of the explicit emotional state has been chosen as follows: 
Explicit emotional state = <e1, e2, …, en> 
 
in which ei denotes the intensity of an emotion type. Every ei refers to a different emotion type.  
A schematic representation of the ESC is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Schematic representation of the Emotional State Calculator. A 
dashed line represents a time delay of 1. 
5.5 Decay 
The decay of an emotional state is a topic that has received special attention in most other AI-
models of emotion and is also a topic mentioned in [Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988] as being a 
specific point of concern for a computational model of emotion. In our system the decay is modeled 
as an event type with a corresponding Event Appraiser and Normalizer. An event of this type occurs 
by definition after a fixed interval of time and sees to it that the emotional state eventually returns to 
a state of rest. A property that determines the appraisal of this event is among other thing the current 
(explicit or implicit) emotional state.  
5.6 Training the system 
 
The system is built out of three types of building blocks. For every type of building block a 
different training strategy has to be used. The order in which the building blocks have to be trained 
or defined is depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Schematic overview of the trainingsprocess 
 
 
First the Emotional State Calculator has to be trained. This is the most difficult part of the system to 
train, as gathering trainingsdata is difficult. A temporal sequence of (NEIV, explicit emotional 
state) pairs is needed to train the Elman network. The NEIVs can be generated randomly, but the 
emotional states have to be annotated by hand.  
There are two problems with this approach. First of all a reasonable amount of trainingsdata is 
needed and secondly the needed data is of an abstract nature, as a result of which annotating even 
one sample isn’t an easy task.  But we feel that the benefits of this tedious work are large enough to 
be profitable. If the Emotional State Calculator has been trained, adding events to the system is easy 
and an Emotional State Calculator is domain-independent and therefore only has to be trained once. 
The trainingsset doesn’t have to be perfect, as the learning algorithm should be able to filter out the 
errors. Therefore the trainer can annotate quickly without worrying too much about errors, which 
makes the annotation task a bit easier. Also, it shouldn’t be overlooked that a significant part of the 
difficulties of training the ESC are inherent to the complexity of the problem of emotions. A nice 
property of our system is that a major part of the complexity of emotions is modelled within a 
domain-independent part of the architecture, so that the same problems don’t have to be solved over 
and over again for every domain and agent.  
  
After the ESC works satisfactory, event types can be added one-by-one to the system. For a new 
event type, an Event Appraiser has to be trained or defined firstly. Again it’s only important that an 
Event Appraiser works well in a qualitative way, which makes defining or training an Event 
Appraiser relatively easy.  
 
From a procedural perspective, training a Normalizer is a bit less straightforward than training the 
ESC or an Event Appraiser. (EIV, NEIV) pairs are needed to train a Normalizer. The user cannot be 
expected to annotate NEIVs, because this would mean among other things that the user has to know 
exactly how the ESC works, which is not a realistic requirement. Therefore we propose the 
following approach.  
Instead of (EIV, NEIV) pairs, (Event Information, Explicit emotional state, State of the ESC) triples 
have to be gathered. This can be done within the real domain. Every time an event of the relevant 
event type occurs, the user has to annotate the new explicit emotional state. The event information 
can be extracted from the event and the current state of the ESC can be copied easily.  After the 
triples have been gathered, the triples have to be converted to the (EIV, NEIV) pairs. It is easy to 
convert the event information to an EIV, as the Event Appraiser is already trained or defined. An 
NEIV can be found by using the inverse of the ESC. If this inverse is known, the explicit emotional 
state (the output of the ESC) and the state of the ESC are enough information to calculate an NEIV.  
Of course the inverse is not known, but using an iterative improvement algorithm (e.g. a simulated 
annealer), can solve this final problem. This algorithm has to find the NEIV that explains the 
explicit emotional state the best. If needed, a second criterion can be that the NEIV has to resemble 
the EIV as much as possible. 
Using this approach makes training a Normalizer easy for a user. Annotating an explicit emotional 
state is easy and as the Normalizers are usually small networks, only a small amount of 
trainingsdata is needed.  
6 A first prototype 
A first prototype of the system has been implemented. In this prototype the various subparts were 
kept as simple as possible, such that we could examine whether the subparts are able to cooperate 
and whether the system as a whole is capable of simulating the required behaviour. One of the 
consequences of this is, that the ESC has not been implemented by the proposed Elman network 
yet.  
 
In the first version only two emotion types are modelled, joy and distress, and seven event types. 
The two emotion types joy and distress were considered as one emotion type, the joy/distress 
emotion type. If the intensity of this emotion type is negative, the agent experiences distress and if 
the intensity is positive, the agent experiences joy. So, an EIV, an NEIV and the explicit emotional 
state, all consist of only one value.  
 
The ESC has been implemented as a simple linear function (and therefore the inverse is known). 
The previous emotional state is one of the variables of the function. Although this simple function 
suits us well in this phase of the research, we are convinced that such a simple approach won’t be 
sufficient in the future and that the described approach with an Elman network is a more powerful 
and a cognitively more credible approach.  
 
The Event Appraisers were kept simple too. We will clarify this part of the architecture a bit more, 
by focusing on the “New_predator_spotted” event type in detail. The events belonging to this event 
type occur when the agent sees a predator for the first time.  
As mentioned before, the variables from the OCC model are the only factors that influence the 
intensity of an emotion type. Although more than one variable is defined in the OCC model, that 
influence the emotion types joy and distress, only the variable desirability determines the appraisal 
value in this version. The event information of the “New_predator_spotted” event type consists of 
two properties: The current health of the agent (health) and the amount of predators the agent has 
seen previously this turn (#seen_previously). If the health of the agent is low, the desirability of the 
event should be lower, than if the health is high, as being near a predator while health is low is very 
dangerous. The property #seen_previously should have a negative effect on the desirability of the 
event, as for instance seeing a third predator is less desirable than seeing a second predator. Taking 
all of this into account, the EIV for this event was defined as follows: 
 
EIV  = <desirability(health, #seen_previously)>  
= <1 * health – 20 * #seen_previously – 100>  
 
Only qualitative and no quantitative arguments and no were taken into account while drawing up 
the formula and as a consequence the 1, 20 and 100 in the formula could for instance just as well 
have been 1.5, 30 and 0.  
  
The Normalizer is a simple feed forward network, with one hidden layer, consisting of only 2 
neurons. Only 20 trainingsamples were used to train the Normalizer. The other Event Appraisers 
and Normalizers were constructed in a similar way. 
 How to test the quality of the system is a hard question and a research project by itself. This version 
was tested in an informal way. We checked whether the emotional behaviour shown by the system 
corresponds to our ideas of emotions, which we also used for annotation. This was the case and 
therefore we can conclude that the architecture looks promising, but a lot more experiments need to 
be conducted before definite conclusions can be made.  
7 Comparison with other models 
Before defining our own models we studied other models. [Pfeifer 1988] gives a nice overview of 
all of the AI-models of emotion until 1988. Since then, more interesting models were put forward. 
[Reilly & Bates 1992] also based their model on the OCC model. In [El-Nasr & Yen 1988] fuzzy 
logic was used, a very useful technique for the emotion domain we think. A system which we want 
to discuss more thoroughly in this section is Cathexis [Velásquez 1997], as it resembles our model 
in a couple of ways; it also has a distributed architecture and special care has been taken to allow 
for maximum flexibility. 
 
Cathexis is composed of a number of “proto-specialist” agents [Minsky 1986], each representing a 
different emotion type. Within each proto-specialist, different sensors are monitoring both external 
and internal stimuli for the existence of the appropriate conditions that would elicit the emotion 
type represented by that particular proto-specialist. Input from these sensors either increases or 
decreases the intensity of the emotion type. Parallel to this process, there’s always a decay process 
going on, which sees to it that the intensity of the emotion type eventually returns to a state of rest. 
The way the sensors function and how the sensors and the decay function affect the intensity can be 
completely defined by a user. Not only the sensors can influence the intensity of an emotion, but 
also other proto-specialists agents can, by providing either inhibitory or excitatory input. A 
schematic overview of the system is depicted in Figure 6. 
Both Cathexis and our approach have distributed architectures. The difference is, that in Cathexis 
the emotions are scalable and in our architecture the complexity of the domain is scalable. The 
advantage of making the emotions scalable is, that it makes it easier to implement a system within a 
simple domain. But, as the domain gets more complex, the approach of Cathexis will experience 
scalability problems we think, as all the proto-specialists have to perform increasingly complex task 
then, while no provisions have been taken to deal with this complexity. 
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Figure 6 The “proto-specialist” agents for anger, fear and distress. (I: 
Intensity) 
  
In our approach it’s difficult to train the ESC for a system with multiple emotion types. But after 
that part has been done, adding more event types is easy. 
The Cathexis system allows for a large degree of flexibility. Nevertheless we don’t think the 
framework is powerful enough to model complex temporal emotional phenomena and phenomena 
in which more than two emotions participate. Our approach does have these possibilities and 
therefore is more powerful than Cathexis.  
For Cathexis a bottom-up approach is used to make a system suitable for a particular domain. We 
think that it will be very difficult to precisely define all the functions and parameters in such a way 
that the system performs well in the case of a complex environment in which a lot of types of events 
can occur. In our architecture the generalization capabilities of neural networks should make it 
easier to handle complex environments and as a top-down approach is used, a full understanding of 
emotional processes and the environment is not needed; the trainer only has to know in practical 
cases, what the right emotional behaviour is.  
8 Conclusion 
An emotion theory based architecture for simulating emotions has been presented in this paper, 
which can be used to develop emotional agents acting within complex environments. A first 
prototype indicated that the various subparts of the distributed architecture are able to cooperate 
well and that the system is able to show natural emotional behaviour.  
 
In this first implementation, the Emotional State Calculator (the ESC) was kept very simple. For the 
eventual system we have proposed a recurrent network of which the state of the network can be 
seen as an implicit emotional state. A foreseen problem of our approach is training the recurrent 
network, as it’s difficult to obtain sufficient trainingsdata. But we feel that this problem is largely 
inherent to the complexity of emotions and that a nice property of our architecture is that a major 
part of this complexity is concentrated within a domain-independent part of the architecture.  
 
In the future we want to expand our prototype with more emotions and event types. Furthermore we 
think that more research is needed on the ESC.   
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